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THE LAWYER'S ROLE BEFORE LITIGATION
LEE LOEVINGER*
A lawyer is consulted regarding antitrust aspects of proposed
business activities; or regarding the possibility that his client may
have a cause of action under some antitrust law. What is his role at
this stage? What are his responsibilities? Would these be substantially
different if the client's problems had no antitrust element?
The system of formulating legal principles and studying and teach-
ing law on the basis of the decisions of litigated cases has one serious
shortcoming, at least, in its tendency to obscure the dual role of the
lawyer: first as counsel, and second as advocate. Both lawyers and
laymen tend to think of the lawyer as an advocate for his client's cause,
rather than as a counsel in avoiding litigation or in determining
whether or not there should be any cause. The result is that lawyers
tend to think and act as advocates, generally to the prejudice of their
role as counsel.
The distinction is, however, an important one. The function of the
advocate is to marshall all the evidence, assemble all the precedents
and present all the arguments favoring a particular result sought by
the client. The effort is to urge and secure a particular result rather
than to determine whether or not the result is justifiable or desirable.
The function is an indispensable and legitimate one. The function of
counsel, on the other hand, is not simply to justify the result desired
by a client but to determine whether a particular end is a justifiable
or desirable one from the legal viewpoint and then to advise the client
accordingly. The counsel is, in a very real sense, acting as an ex parte
judge at a pre-trial stage of a transaction that may never reach the
trial stage.
The inconsistency of the roles of counsel and advocate can be il-
lustrated by recalling the objections to the combining in a single per-
son or agency of the function of prosecutor (or advocate) and judge.
The objection to the combination of these functions is not that any
particular individual is or will be corrupt, but that psychologically
the human mind cannot both seek to persuade and weigh the argu-
ment formulated by itself in the same matter.
This inconsistency has very practical applications to the lawyer's
functions in private practice. When the lawyer serves as advocate
for his client's cause he seeks to justify his client's conduct by urging
upon the court the most favorable version of the evidence and the
most favorable precedents that can be found, even though the weight
* Member, Larson, Loevinger, Lindquist, Freeman and Fraser, Minneapolis,
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of evidence and authority may appear to be against him. Indeed,
the lawyer as an advocate may even urge that the court should go be-
yond any precedents and make new law favoring his client's cause.
However, when the lawyer acts as counsel he is helping the client de-
cide whether or not to undertake a particular course of action-either
following some course the legal consequences of which may be
doubtful or instituting or defending a lawsuit. A reasonable decision
as to the wisdom of prospective action cannot be made on the basis of
a partisan or one-sided view of the evidence and the law, but requires
the most nearly objective evaluation of the situation and the applicable
legal principles that the lawyer is capable of formulating. Conse-
quently the lawyer who acts as an advocate for the view he thinks
his client holds when he is called upon to counsel a client is in reality
doing a disservice to the client. The lawyer acting as an advocate has
not only the right but the duty to urge the resolution of all doubts in
favor of his client. On the other hand, the lawyer who counsels a client
on the basis of resolving numerous doubtful points in favor of a de-
sired result will usually mislead the client into a much less favorable
position than was anticipated.
Consequently a client who seeks the advice of a lawyer, either as
to a future course of conduct or as to the institution of litigation, is en-
titled to receive judicious and judicial (or quasi-judicial) counsel re-
gardless of the fact that the client may desire and even request a parti-
san opinion. The fact that the client may desire to act contrary to his
lawyer's advice is another matter, as is the question of whether or not
the lawyer should bring an action contrary to his own judgment of
the controversy. In most cases a client will take his lawyer's advice
on the institution of a lawsuit, but in any event the lawyer is bound
to render proper advice.
The problem of advising a client as to whether or not litigation
should be initiated is surely one of the most difficult and important
tasks any lawyer performs. Unfortunately there is very little to guide
the lawyer in this field. Most of our legal principles are derived from
the decisions of cases that have been litigated; and every litigated
case obviously represents the judgment of some lawyer that litigation
is justified in that situation. The courts are seldom willing to add
insult to injury by declaring not only that the loser should be thrown
out of court but also that he should never have come into court.
Probably the court rarely has sufficient knowledge of the evidence
available to the parties before trial to be willing to make such a
declaration. The Canons of Ethics mark only the outermost limits
of permissible action, and are of little assistance in setting up guides
to proper or prudent action. The professors often lack the practical
experience necessary to judgment in this area and the law school
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curricula make no provision for the study of such prosaic problems.
Ultimately the determination to incur the expense and inconvenience
of a lawsuit must be an intensely practical decision. This is no mere
hypothetical question as to what the law is or ought to be on an as-
sumed state of facts. This is an irretrievable commitment of time,
money and labor-in an antitrust case much of all three. Experienced
trial lawyers always look for three essential elements in a case before
deciding to sue: Liability-damages-and solvency.
Obviously there is no use in bringing an action unless liability exists.
The "nuisance suit" may appeal to the layman, to the irate or dis-
gruntled, or to the paranoiac, but every competent trial lawyer knows
that, all other considerations apart, in the short run it is not worth his
time and in the long run it will destroy his effectiveness and standing
in the profession. The existence of apparent liability as an indispens-
able condition to bringing a suit involves two quite different things.
First, there must be a substantive violation of law, or contravention
of legal principles imposing liability as a consequence. This is the mat-
ter that is typically considered in law schools, seminars and discus-
sions, law review articles, and appellate decisions. Whether or not a
given state of facts involves liability under prevailing principles of
law is the subject of innumerable volumes in every field of law,
occupying endless shelves and stacks in law libraries throughout the
world. It is the first topic with which the aspiring law student is con-
fronted; and the ultimate issue considered by the judges of the court
of last resort in their final opinion denying the last petition for re-
hearing. The minimum qualification of any lawyer qualified to prac-
tice must be the ability at least to address himself to the solution of
this problem in a given situation.
Of course, this does not mean that there is a neat or decisive answer
to every question as to the existence of liability on a given state of
facts. Particularly in the developing field of trade regulation there are
numerous questions as to which the answer is doubtful. As to these,
however, the lawyer must evaluate the probabilities of the various re-
sults by weighing analagous cases and doctrines in the familiar and
usual manner. Most often, though, the result reached will depend
more upon the facts assumed, or proved, than on the legal principles in-
voked. There are few cases, indeed, in which the result reached could
not be reversed by changing only a few of the many facts involved
in the situation. Consequently the second, and possibly most im-
portant, aspect of determining the existence of liability lies in as-
certaining the evidence.
Note the last word. Lawyers and judges often talk about the "facts"
of a case, but in reality there are no such things so far as litigation is
concerned. Lawsuits are decided on evidence, not on facts. The evi-
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dence may, and is assumed to, correspond more or less closely to the
facts. But this is not necessarily or always true. There may well be
facts without any competent evidence to prove them. They are of no
significance in the decision of a lawsuit. A lawyer may gamble on being
able to establish certain facts from evidence becoming available during
the trial but not in his possession prior to trial, as, for example, testi-
mony expected to be elicited from adverse witnesses on cross-examina-
tion. But there is no justification whatever for going to trial because
of a belief as to "facts" which has no support in evidence either known
or reasonably foreseeable. Therefore the existence of liability depends
upon either having in possession or having a reasonable probability
of getting evidence from which a state of facts can properly be inferred
which on the basis of established substantive principles of law will
support a conclusion of liability.
How far a lawyer should go in order to assure himself of the
existence and availability of such evidence before bringing suit must
be determined by the personal judgment of the lawyer in each case.
It is clear that the more thorough the investigation prior to the filing
of suit the smaller will be the possibility of surprise or disappoint-
ment in the result of the suit. Further, experience strongly urges
that there be at least some investigation of the facts beyond the ques-
tioning of the client. A lawyer must keep in mind that his client is
an adverse witness from the viewpoint of the opposition and a highly
interested witness from the viewpoint of the court. The lawyer should
place no more reliance on the unsupported testimony of his client than
he would on the unsupported testimony of any other witness. It
may be assumed that clients are no more reliable than any other class
of witnesses, and are more interested than ordinary witnesses. Co-
herence and plausibility are no guarantee of accuracy or veracity,
although their absence may well impugn testimony. The pre-trial
discovery procedures contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide a means of obtaining evidence from adverse parties and
neutral witnesses after action has been started and before trial. But
they have nothing to do with investigation of the evidence that is in the
control of a party. Since the opposition will certainly "discover" this
evidence, and since it will be necessary for the lawyer to go over all
such evidence prior to trial in any event, common prudence would
dictate that all evidence in the possession of the client should be in-
spected before reaching any decision as to the bringing of suit. Or-
dinarily there will be some documentary evidence or disinterested
testimony to corroborate or impeach the story of the client. In the
rare case where the lawyer is unable to secure any evidence other
than* his client's story prior to starting action, great caution is indicated
in weighing the other factors that must be considered at this stage.
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After ascertaining that there is a legitimate claim for relief under
the law, and that the available evidence will establish the facts show-
ing this claim, the lawyer .must consider how substantial the claim is
-Jhow large are the damages suffered or threatened. This is par-
ticularly true in an antitrust or trade regulation case which is almost
certain to be lengthy, complex and difficult. It is absurd to start an
action which, if successful, will profit the client no more than the cost
of suit and attorney's fees. It might appear that this has no applica-
tion to an action under statutes like the antitrust laws which provide
for the recovery of treble damages plus reasonable attorney's fees.
In practice, this principle has particular application to antitrust ac-
tions.
To begin with, as- the laws now stand, attorney's fees are not re-
coverable in a suit in which the only relief afforded is an injunction;
they are awarded only when damages are also iecovered. Conse-
quently when the principal relief sought is an injunction, even though
there may also be some prayer for damages, it should be assumed
that the monetary recovery from the defendant will be minimal, and
the lawyer must be sure that the client is confident that injunctive re-
lief will be sufficiently valuable to the client to justify the payment
of the expenses bf'suit including an adequate attorney's fee.
In the second place, it must be kept in mind that "costs," under the
American plan of litigation, are essentially nominal and do not in fact
include more than a small fraction of the usual out-of-pocket expenses
of preparing and trying a protracted or difficult case, such as an anti-
trust suit. The cost of travel,, nVestigation, court reporters, depositions,
accountants, preparation of exhibits, stenographic services, photostat-
ting, and the numerous other expenses of preparation and trial can,
and in an antitrust suit usually do, run into many thousands of dollars
that are not allowable as statutory costs.
Finally, it must be said that, in my opinion, the courts almost never
allow as a "reasonable attorney's fee" an amount that is, under present
conditions, adequate to compensate a lawyer for his services in trying
an antitrust suit through to judgment. While this is necessarily a sub-
jective judgment, it is based upon an examination of most of the re-
ported antitrust cases involving the allowance of an attorney's fee
and upon fairly wide inquiry among attorneys as to prevailing stand-
ards of charges. Therefore a lawyer who undertakes to handle a
private, suit under the antitrust laws must almost as a matter of eco-
nomic necessity look to his client for compensation in addition to the
court allowance of a statutory fee. Needless to say, this will, in most
cases, involve a sharing in the damages recovered on a contingqn4 and
percentage basis. "
In this connection, it must also be kept constantly in mind that
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even in cases where a cause of action is established and damage to the
plaintiff is proved, the courts are very cautious in holding evidence
competent to establish the amount (as distinguished from the fact)
of damages.1 Furthermore, even where the facts are readily estab-
lished, it is impossible to predict with any assurance how the court
or a jury will interpret the facts in calculating the amount of damages.
Therefore it is necessary to be extremely conservative in preliminary
estimates of the "value" of an antitrust or similar case from the plain-
tiff's viewpoint prior to trial.
On the other hand, expenses are very likely to exceed early esti-
mates. Some companies that have been involved as defendants in a
number of antitrust cases have adopted deliberate policies of taking
extended depositions, engaging in extensive pre-trial proceedings, and
contesting almost every point when forced to trial. This inevitably
runs up expenses to all parties to a very substantial degree. Even
where this is not undertaken as a trial tactic, the pre-trial and trial
proceedings in a complex trade regulation case are likely to become
very expensive to all parties, and to be felt most keenly by those
parties with the most limited resources. Thus, before starting action
in a trade regulation matter, the lawyer must determine that a con-
servative estimate of the damages recoverable indicates an amount
sufficient to cover a liberal estimate of costs and expenses, to permit
payment of an adequate fee to the attorney, and to leave an amount
sufficient to compensate the client for his time and trouble in the
prosecution of the case as well as to make some contribution toward
reparation of his damages. Viewed in this light it will be found that
many cases which might initially appear to justify legal action simply
are not economically practical. The damages suffered or threatened
must be very substantial to justify the institution of an antitrust suit
on behalf of a private plaintiff.
Finally, even where there is a good cause of action based upon
available evidence and the damages are substantial enough to pay all
expenses and to compensate both the attorney and the party, there
must still be the assurance that the damages recovered can be col-
lected. In personal injury actions this is usually a matter of personal
solvency or of the existence of insurance. In antitrust and trade regu-
lation actions the defendants are more likely to be sufficiently solvent
to pay the judgments, but there is no insurance for those cases where
defendants do not have assets subject to execution that are sufficient
to pay any judgment recovered.
1. See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1957); American
Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1951); Loevinger,
Enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act by Private Parties in How to
Comply with Robinson-Patman Act, in ANTrnRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM (CCH
1957); cf. Enterprise Industries v. Texas Co., 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1957).
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After investigating, analyzing and weighing the evidence, ascertain-
ing the applicable law, and determining the economic value of a case,
there still remain a number of points which a lawyer should consider
before bringing suit. In all situations an effort should be made to de-
termine the practical problem which brings the client into the lawyer's
office in the first place. With the exception of a few neurotic litigants,
most people and most businessmen dislike litigation or the prospect
of litigation, and will consider it only when they feel that they have
been dealt with unjustly and severely injured or are threatened with
severe injury. Their estimate of injustice and injury may not coin-
cide with the legal view, but it should certainly be taken into ac-
count. It may be found that what the client seeks is something less
than or different than he might secure by legal action, or that some
adjustment in business relations will solve the practical problem pre-
sented without involving the legal issues. This may permit of a
solution to the client's problem without the necessity of litigation or
even negotiation (as where a different method of doing business
or a different source of supply may avoid supposed discrimination).
More typically, this may present an opportunity to dispose of the
problem by negotiation and settlement before the positions of the
parties have hardened into the adversary posture assumed in litiga-
tion. Certainly the possibility of adjustment or settlement of the
difficulty presented should be fully examined and, if possible, explored
before any commitment to litigation is made in a trade regulation mat-
ter. As such cases are typically more complex than ordinary cases,
so are they also more flexible and various in offering the possibility
for exercising ingenuity in devising solutions or settlements other
than litigation.
A point that must concern any lawyer contemplating suit almost as
much as the merits of the cause is the character of the client. That the
client must be honest and credible and not subject to legitimate at-
tack as to his own conduct in the transactions involved should go
without saying. Beyond this, the lawyer must be reasonably sure
that the client is genuinely concerned and determined and able to
bear the expenses, the pressures and the delays of litigation. Many
people, perhaps most of us, will go through periods of intense in-
dignation and outrage during which they will be willing to undertake
almost any difficulty in order to secure satisfaction or assuage their
feelings. When the intensity of emotion generated by the immediately
inciting incident has subsided it is common to want to forget the mat-
ter, or, at least, to avoid further difficulty concerning it. Most lawyers
have had some experience with the client who is willing to spend his
"last cent" to avenge some injustice-until the case is called for trial,
when he suddenly decides he's willing to settle on any basis. The
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lawyer must take extraordinary care to avoid being put in such a
situation in a trade regulation case for the reason that the preparation,
pre-trial and trial are likely to be so protracted and difficult as to ex-
haust even the determined and stable individual, much less the vacil-
lating or unstable one. Unless the client himself is sufficiently de-
termined and stable to be willing to persist in his course throughout
the time necessary to pursue such a case, the lawyer can hope for
no better result than sheer catastrophe.
The suggestions that have been offered as to the considerations a
lawyer should weigh before advising or undertaking litigation have
been based, primarily on prudence rather than law or ethics. But
principles of both law and ethics are involved. This is necessarily so
in our legal system. It is basic to the American system of administer-
ing justice that the courts are open to any and every one who has, or
thinks he has, a complaint. However many things of which people are
wont to complain are trivial, based on surmise or incapable of proof,
or are not cognizable at law. It would be an intolerable load for our
already overburdened courts to be forced to hear and determine the
tale of every individual who fancied himself aggrieved by another in
any situation. The preliminary task of sorting out the grievances
which at least deserve the attention and time of a court from those that
do not is, in our system, necessarily performed by the lawyer in his
office. So, the lawyer is acting in a very real sense as an officer of the
court and a quasi-judge when he counsels a client either to undertake
or not to undertake litigation.
There are wide limits within which a lawyer may properly exercise
his own judgment and discretion in discharging this function. The
limits are, undoubtedly, even wider than those within which a trial
judge has freedom to decide. But, in both cases, there are limits be-
yond which action may not properly go. It has been said:
[A] lawyer who consciously undertakes to thwart justice is unfit for
the position, as much as the judge who accepts a bribe, or knowingly
decides a case againstthe law and the right; and it should be understood
that they are subjected to the same responsibilities. They have a duty,
to their clients; but that is not the first duty, as is generally supposed.
Their first duty is the administration of justice, and their duty to their
client is subordinate to that.2
It is self-evident that both law and professional ethics proscribe the
making of claims in litigation that are based on falsehood or fabricated
evidence. It should be almost equally obvious that it is improper to
base claims on a client's desire to be malicious or vexatious. These
principles are specifically stated in the Canons of Professional Ethics,
2. In re Thomas, 36 Fed. 242 (C.C.D. Colo., 1888).
[ VOL.. 11
1957 ] THE LAWYER'S ROLE BEFORE LITIGATION 163
which are generally recognized and given the effect of court rule or
law in most states.
3
Even beyond this, there is a vague but inescapable duty of the law-
yer to be more than honest and moral in bringing matters before a
court. It is difficult to define in general terms what this "more" con-
sists of. In one case a court has said that a lawyer having knowledge
of suspicious circumstances throwing grave doubt on claims asserted
should have declined to represent a claimant. The court defined the
duty of the lawyer in terms of the canon of ethics by stating:-
Every lawyer upon his own responsibility must decide what.business
he will accept as counsel, what causes he will bring in Court for plain-
tiffs, what cases he will contest in court for defendants. The responsi-
bility for advising as to questionable transactions, for bringing question-
able suits for urging questionable defenses, is the lawyer's responsibility.
He cannot escape it by urging as an excuse that he is only following his
client's instructions. 4
Contrary to popular (and some professional) opinion, it is neither
the function, duty nor right of the lawyer to urge purely technical
points without regard to the basic merits of a case. As to this one
court has observed:
Obsolete technicalities, which the people cannot understand, have no
more place in the law than dog latin and Egyptian hieroglyphics would
have, and it is the duty of the courts to cut them out. The lawyers who
resist this are the real quacks of the profession.
.... [T]rying... cases on the basis of technicalities, without reference
to merit or justice . . . is not practicing law; it is practicing quibbling,
and the courts are to be blamed for permitting it to be done.5
In sum, it seems fair to say that the ethical and legal duty of the
lawyer with respect to litigation is a duty to be reasonable, however
vague and broad the standard of reasonableness may be in any given
situation. It has been held by the United States Supreme Court that
conduct by lawyers which is so unreasonable as to interfere with the
expeditious, orderly and dispassionate administration of justice may be
grounds for a finding of contempt or even disbarment.6 It is important
to note that insofar as the rule of these cases can be generalized the
conduct involved was not dishonest, deceptive or immoral, but merely
unreasonable; and therefore they stand unequivocally for the propo-
sition that there is a legal obligation of lawyers to be reasonable with
respect to litigation.
It is also important to bear in mind that the principles which have
3. Canons of Professional Ethics of American Bar Association, canons 15, 30.
4. In re Wendel's Estate, 159 Misc. 443, 287 N.Y.S. 893 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
5. Ostendorf v. State, 8 Okla. Crin. 360, 128 Pac. 143 (1912).
6. In 'e disbarment of Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953); Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
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been discussed and the legal duties of the lawyer regarding litigation
are applicable equally to both plaintiffs' and defense counsel. It seems
sometimes to be assumed that although it is improper to base a com-
plaint upon allegations that are contrary to the facts and evidence,
an answer to a complaint is a formal matter that is expected to deny
all allegations of the complaint without regard to the facts or evidence.
Clearly this is not the case. It is not only improper, but is grounds
for disciplinary action to interpose false pleadings or general denials
in response to plainly true allegations.7 The principles of the cases
and the Canons of Ethics which have been mentioned apply equally
and explicitly to the defense of a cause and to the institution of an
action.
An attorney who is counsel or prospective counsel for a party who
has been sued is certainly in a different practical position than an
attorney who is consulted by a prospective plaintiff. Some of the
practical problems which confront a prospective plaintiff's counsel do
not appear, and the decision as to whether there shall be litigation
at all has obviously been taken. However, there is still a wide area
of choice as to whether the litigation shall be contested and, if so,
in what manner and as to what issues. Defense counsel is haunted
by the fear that if liability is conceded or an attempt is made to settle
the case at an early stage the plaintiff will be encouraged to demand
an unreasonable amount in damages. But just as a plaintiff has the
right to bring his claim into court regardless of the position the de-
fendant may take, so the defendant has a right to insist on a decision
in court if the plaintiff is unreasonable in his demands. So the assumed
rapacity of plaintiffs is no more excuse for unreasonableness by de-
fendants than the assumed intransigence of defendants is an excuse
for unreasonableness by plaintiffs. As one court has recently ob-
served, in a case with substantial merits, it is equally unreasonable for
defendant to seek settlement for a nominal sum before trial and for
plaintiff to demand an excessive sum.8
Lawyers sometimes seek to justify unreasonable positions with the
excuse that they are merely representing the position of a client and
that the client is entitled to legal representation in any event. Indubit-
ably there is a right to legal representation in all criminal cases, and
possibly in cases involving "civil rights," such as the right to worship
and speak freely, to travel about, to be free of official oppression, to
vote, to have one's children educated, and so forth. However, this
7. United States v. Frank, 53 F.2d 128 (D.C. N.J., 1931); Bruns v. State Bar,
213 Cal. 151, 1 P.2d 989 (1931); People v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 27 N.E. 1096
(1891); In re Tinney, 187 App. Div. 569, 176 N.Y.S. 102 (1st Dep't 1919); In re
Schreiber, 170 App. Div. 543, 156 N.Y.S. 398 (1st Dep't 1915); In re Green-
baum, 161 App. Div. 558, 146 N.Y.S. 969 (1st Dep't 1914).
8. Cangemi v. Silverman, 2 Misc. 2d 199, 155 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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discussion is confined to a consideration of what may be called "priv-
ate cases," primarily those involving the protection of individual or
corporate economic interests. In such cases there is no right to
representation unless the cause is just and the position reasonable. No
lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for everyone who
may wish to become his client; and every lawyer has the right and
the duty to decline to serve or to withdraw as counsel for a client
who attempts to press an unjust course or an unreasonable or frivolous
case or defense.9
The determination of what is just and unjust, reasonable and un-
reasonable is always a difficult and delicate task. It is particularly so
in the circumstances in which a lawyer is ordinarily called upon to
make the determination: an ex parte recital of testimony from highly
biased witnesses, limited opportunity for investigation of the facts,
and strong pecuniary motivation to take a particular view. But this
inescapable task will be somewhat easier if the lawyer will bear in
mind that he is an advocate only after the case has started. Before the
litigation has started, or before the lawyer has become involved on
behalf of his client, his role is that of counsel, and this is a quasi-
judicial role. There are no specific rules, short of the whole body of
substantive and procedural law, that can be laid down to guide a law-
yer in knowing when and how to initiate litigation or interpose a de-
fense. But it is the lawyer's duty as counsel in such matters to advise
and act in a reasonable manner. This is his duty to his client, to
himself, and, above all, to the law and its ideal of justice. These gen-
eral principles will not, by themselves, solve the specific problems of
any lawyer. But they may aid the lawyer in orienting himself toward
the solution of specific problems. A conscientious effort by lawyers
before litigation to act as counsel rather than advocate and to be
reasonable as well as honest would probably result in substantially
less contested litigation than there is today.
9. Canons of Professional Ethics of American Bar Association, canons 31,
44; Smith v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 60 Iowa 515, 15 N.W. 291 (1883).

